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.Take the latter distinction first: Immediately all the arguments based on sensations and the newfeatures in them which attention brings to light fall to the ground.The sensations of the B and theV when we attend to these sounds and analyze out the laryngeal contribution which makes themdiffer from P and F respectively, are different sensations from those of the B and the V taken in asimple way.They stand, it is true, for the same letters, and thus mean the same outer realities;but they are different mental affections, and certainly depend on widely different processes ofcerebral activity.It is unbelievable that two mental [p.173] states so different as the passivereception of a sound as a whole, and the analysis of that whole into distinct ingredients byvoluntary attention, should be due to processes at all similar.And the subjective difference doesnot consist in that the first-named state is the second in an 'unconscious' form.It is an absolutepsychic difference, even greater than that between the states to which two different surds willgive rise.The same is true of the other sensations chosen as examples.The man who learns forthe first time how the closure of his glottis feels, experiences in this discovery an absolutely newpsychic modification, the like of which he never had before.He had another feeling before, afeeling incessantly renewed, and of which the same glottis was the organic starting point; but thatwas not the later feeling in an 'unconscious' state; it was a feeling sui generis altogether, althoughit took cognizance of the same bodily part, the glottis.We shall see, hereafter, that the samereality can be cognized by an endless number of psychic states, which may differ toto coeloamong themselves, without ceasing on that account to refer to the reality in question.Each ofthem is a conscious fact; none of them has any mode of being whatever except a certain way ofbeing felt at the moment of being present.It is simply unintelligible and fantastical to say,because they point to the same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many editions of thesame 'idea,' now in conscious and now in an 'unconscious' phase.There is only one 'phase' inwhich an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition.If it is not in that condition, then itis not at all.Something else is, in its place.The something else may be a merely physical brain-process, or it may be another conscious idea.Either of these things may perform much the samefunction as the first idea, refer to the same object, and roughly stand in the same relations to theupshot of our thought.But that is no reason why we should throw away the logical principle ofidentity in psychology, and say that, however it may fare in the outer world, the mind at any rateis a place in which a thing can be all kinds of other things without ceasing to be itself as well.Now take the other cases alleged, and the other distinc- [p.174] tion, that namely between havinga mental state and knowing all about it.The truth is here even simpler to unravel.When I decidethat I have, without knowing it, been for several weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to aGet any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY106state which previously I have not named, but which was fully conscious; which had no residualmode of being except the manner in which it was conscious; and which, though it was a feelingtowards the same person for whom I now have much more inflamed feeling, and though itcontinuously led into the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the same name, is yet in nosense identical with the latter, and least of all in an 'unconscious' way.Again, the feelings fromour viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of innervation (if such there be), and thoseof muscular exertion which, in our spatial judgments, are supposed unconsciously to determinewhat we shall perceive, are just exactly what we feel them, perfectly determinate consciousstates, not vague editions of other conscious states.They may be faint and weak; they may bevery vague cognizers of the same realities which other conscious states cognize and nameexactly; they may be unconscious of much in the reality which the other states are conscious of.But that does not make them in themselves a whit dim or vague or unconscious.They areeternally as they feel when they exist, and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified withanything else than their own faint selves.A faint feeling may be looked back upon and classifiedand understood in its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of thought [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Take the latter distinction first: Immediately all the arguments based on sensations and the newfeatures in them which attention brings to light fall to the ground.The sensations of the B and theV when we attend to these sounds and analyze out the laryngeal contribution which makes themdiffer from P and F respectively, are different sensations from those of the B and the V taken in asimple way.They stand, it is true, for the same letters, and thus mean the same outer realities;but they are different mental affections, and certainly depend on widely different processes ofcerebral activity.It is unbelievable that two mental [p.173] states so different as the passivereception of a sound as a whole, and the analysis of that whole into distinct ingredients byvoluntary attention, should be due to processes at all similar.And the subjective difference doesnot consist in that the first-named state is the second in an 'unconscious' form.It is an absolutepsychic difference, even greater than that between the states to which two different surds willgive rise.The same is true of the other sensations chosen as examples.The man who learns forthe first time how the closure of his glottis feels, experiences in this discovery an absolutely newpsychic modification, the like of which he never had before.He had another feeling before, afeeling incessantly renewed, and of which the same glottis was the organic starting point; but thatwas not the later feeling in an 'unconscious' state; it was a feeling sui generis altogether, althoughit took cognizance of the same bodily part, the glottis.We shall see, hereafter, that the samereality can be cognized by an endless number of psychic states, which may differ toto coeloamong themselves, without ceasing on that account to refer to the reality in question.Each ofthem is a conscious fact; none of them has any mode of being whatever except a certain way ofbeing felt at the moment of being present.It is simply unintelligible and fantastical to say,because they point to the same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many editions of thesame 'idea,' now in conscious and now in an 'unconscious' phase.There is only one 'phase' inwhich an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition.If it is not in that condition, then itis not at all.Something else is, in its place.The something else may be a merely physical brain-process, or it may be another conscious idea.Either of these things may perform much the samefunction as the first idea, refer to the same object, and roughly stand in the same relations to theupshot of our thought.But that is no reason why we should throw away the logical principle ofidentity in psychology, and say that, however it may fare in the outer world, the mind at any rateis a place in which a thing can be all kinds of other things without ceasing to be itself as well.Now take the other cases alleged, and the other distinc- [p.174] tion, that namely between havinga mental state and knowing all about it.The truth is here even simpler to unravel.When I decidethat I have, without knowing it, been for several weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to aGet any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY106state which previously I have not named, but which was fully conscious; which had no residualmode of being except the manner in which it was conscious; and which, though it was a feelingtowards the same person for whom I now have much more inflamed feeling, and though itcontinuously led into the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the same name, is yet in nosense identical with the latter, and least of all in an 'unconscious' way.Again, the feelings fromour viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of innervation (if such there be), and thoseof muscular exertion which, in our spatial judgments, are supposed unconsciously to determinewhat we shall perceive, are just exactly what we feel them, perfectly determinate consciousstates, not vague editions of other conscious states.They may be faint and weak; they may bevery vague cognizers of the same realities which other conscious states cognize and nameexactly; they may be unconscious of much in the reality which the other states are conscious of.But that does not make them in themselves a whit dim or vague or unconscious.They areeternally as they feel when they exist, and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified withanything else than their own faint selves.A faint feeling may be looked back upon and classifiedand understood in its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of thought [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]