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[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.However, truth-ful people may never realize that every word they utter,every gesture and facial twitch is scrutinized at some point,by someone who suspects them of lying; and, some truthfulpeople believe that they are subject to such scrutiny, when,in fact, they are not.Liars do not always know whether ornot their victims suspect their deceits.An elaborate excusedesigned to allay suspicion may raise a question in the mindof a previously trusting victim.Victims who suspect theyare being deceived may themselves lie, concealing theirsuspicions, to lull the liar into a false move.There are otherreasons why a victim may lull the liar.In counterintelli-gence, when a spy is uncovered the discovery may be con-cealed so as to feed false information through the spy to theenemy.Other victims may conceal their discovery of beingmisled in order to enjoy reversing the tables and, for a time,watch the liar continue to spin his fabrications unawarethat the victim now knows all is false.There are both gains and losses for the lie catcher if thesuspect does not know that he is suspected of lying.A liarmay not cover tracks, anticipate questions, prepare excuses,rehearse the line, and in other ways be cautious if he doesnot believe every move is being scrutinized by a suspiciousvictim.As time passes and the lie appears to be totallyswallowed, a liar may become so relaxed that mistakesoccur because of overconfidence.This gain for the liecatcher is offset by the likelihood that a liar who is sooverconfident as to become sloppy is not likely to feel muchdetection apprehension.Careless mistakes are purchased atthe cost of mistakes due to detection apprehension.Notonly are the behavioral clues to deceit generated by detec-tion apprehension sacrificed, but lost also are the disorgan- 182 Telling Liesizing effects of such fear, which can, like overconfidence,produce poor planning.Perhaps the most important loss isthe torment of fearing capture, which is not likely to be-come strong enough to motivate confession if the liar doesnot think anyone is on to him.Ross Mullaney, an expert in training police interroga-tors, advocates what he calls the Trojan Horse strategy, inwhich the police officer pretends to believe the suspect, toget the subject to talk more and become entangled in hisown fabrications.Even though the detection apprehensionmay decrease, the suspect is more likely to make a revealingmistake, according to Mullaney: "The officer should en-courage the source [suspect] in his deceit by pulling himforward, seeking always more and more detail in the sus-pected fabrications being offered.In a real sense, the officeralso deceives as he pretends to believe the source.[I]tcannot harm the honest source.If the officer is in error inhis initial suspicion that the.suspect may be deceiving.[this technique of interrogating] will not cause anyinjustice.Only the deceitful need fear [it]."5 This strategyis reminiscent of Schopenhauer's advice: "If you have rea-son to suspect that a person is telling you a lie, look asthough you believed every word he said.This will give himcourage to go on; he will become more vehement in hisassertions and in the end betray himself."6While belief that the target is trusting seems certain todecrease a liar's detection apprehension, it is difficult to sayhow such knowledge will affect other feelings about lying.Some liars may feel more deception guilt in misleading atrusting target than a suspicious one.Others might feel lessguilty, rationalizing that as long as the target does notknow and is not tortured by suspicions, no harm is done.Such liars may believe their lies are motivated primarily bykindness, to spare their victim's sensibilities.Duping de-light also could go either way, strengthened or diminished Dangers and Precautions183if the liar knows the target is trusting.Duping a totallytrusting victim may be especially delicious, indulging en-joyable feelings of contempt; yet, deceiving a suspicioustarget may be exciting because of the challenge.There is no way, then, to predict whether a liar is moreor less likely to make mistakes if his target makes his suspi-cions known.There is, of course, a chance that the suspi-cions are ungrounded; the suspect may be honest.Wouldit be easier to tell that a suspect is truthful if the suspect didnot know he was under suspicion? If he does not know heis suspected of lying, he should not fear being disbelieved;nor would there be anger or distress about being suspectedof lying, and the suspect, even if guilt-ridden, would haveno special opportunity to act as if wrong had been done.This is all to the good, since the signs of any of theseemotions can then be interpreted simply as clues to deceitwithout any need to worry that they might instead be atruthful person's feelings about being suspected.This gainis purchased, however, at the already-mentioned cost thatsome of the feelings about lying that produce clues to de-ceit, particularly detection apprehension, will be weaker ifthis person who does not know anyone suspects him oflying is indeed a liar.When the suspect doesn't know thereis suspicion, the lie catcher is less likely to make disbeliev-ing-the-truth errors because the signs of emotion, if theyoccur, are more likely to be clues to deceit; but there maybe more believing-a-lie mistakes, because feelings aboutlying are less likely to be strong enough to betray the liar.The reverse probably happens if suspicion is knownmore disbelieving-the-truth but less believing-a-lie.Two other problems complicate the matter of whetherthe lie catcher would be better off if the suspect didn'tknow he was under suspicion.First, the lie catcher mayhave no choice.Not every situation will permit the targetto conceal his suspicions.Even if possible, not everyone 184 Telling Lieswho thinks he may be the target of a lie would want toconceal his suspicions, lying to catch a liar.And not everylie catcher has the talent as a liar to succeed undiscoveredin his deceit.The second problem is worse.By trying to conceal hissuspicions, the lie catcher risks failing in this concealmentwithout realizing it.He certainly can't count on the liar tobe truthful about the matter! Some liars may boldly con-front their target once they note that the target is suspi-cious, especially if they can expose their target's attemptsat concealment.The liar may pose self-righteousness, in-dignant and hurt that the target was not forthright abouthis suspicions, unfairly depriving the liar of a chance tovindicate himself.Even if this ploy does not convince, itmay at least intimidate the target for a time.Not every liarwill be so brazen.Some might conceal their discovery thatthe target has become suspicious so that they can gain timeto cover their tracks, prepare an escape, etc.Unfortunately,it is not just the liar who may conceal such a discovery.Truthful people may also conceal that they have discoveredthey are under suspicion.Their reasons can be quite varied.They may conceal knowing that they are under suspicionin order to avoid a scene, or to buy time in which they hopeto gather evidence in their support, or to take actions thatthose who suspect them will judge in their favor if it isthought that they acted unaware of being suspect.One advantage gained by revealing suspicions is thatthis morass of uncertainties can be avoided.At least thetarget knows that the suspect knows there is suspicion [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.However, truth-ful people may never realize that every word they utter,every gesture and facial twitch is scrutinized at some point,by someone who suspects them of lying; and, some truthfulpeople believe that they are subject to such scrutiny, when,in fact, they are not.Liars do not always know whether ornot their victims suspect their deceits.An elaborate excusedesigned to allay suspicion may raise a question in the mindof a previously trusting victim.Victims who suspect theyare being deceived may themselves lie, concealing theirsuspicions, to lull the liar into a false move.There are otherreasons why a victim may lull the liar.In counterintelli-gence, when a spy is uncovered the discovery may be con-cealed so as to feed false information through the spy to theenemy.Other victims may conceal their discovery of beingmisled in order to enjoy reversing the tables and, for a time,watch the liar continue to spin his fabrications unawarethat the victim now knows all is false.There are both gains and losses for the lie catcher if thesuspect does not know that he is suspected of lying.A liarmay not cover tracks, anticipate questions, prepare excuses,rehearse the line, and in other ways be cautious if he doesnot believe every move is being scrutinized by a suspiciousvictim.As time passes and the lie appears to be totallyswallowed, a liar may become so relaxed that mistakesoccur because of overconfidence.This gain for the liecatcher is offset by the likelihood that a liar who is sooverconfident as to become sloppy is not likely to feel muchdetection apprehension.Careless mistakes are purchased atthe cost of mistakes due to detection apprehension.Notonly are the behavioral clues to deceit generated by detec-tion apprehension sacrificed, but lost also are the disorgan- 182 Telling Liesizing effects of such fear, which can, like overconfidence,produce poor planning.Perhaps the most important loss isthe torment of fearing capture, which is not likely to be-come strong enough to motivate confession if the liar doesnot think anyone is on to him.Ross Mullaney, an expert in training police interroga-tors, advocates what he calls the Trojan Horse strategy, inwhich the police officer pretends to believe the suspect, toget the subject to talk more and become entangled in hisown fabrications.Even though the detection apprehensionmay decrease, the suspect is more likely to make a revealingmistake, according to Mullaney: "The officer should en-courage the source [suspect] in his deceit by pulling himforward, seeking always more and more detail in the sus-pected fabrications being offered.In a real sense, the officeralso deceives as he pretends to believe the source.[I]tcannot harm the honest source.If the officer is in error inhis initial suspicion that the.suspect may be deceiving.[this technique of interrogating] will not cause anyinjustice.Only the deceitful need fear [it]."5 This strategyis reminiscent of Schopenhauer's advice: "If you have rea-son to suspect that a person is telling you a lie, look asthough you believed every word he said.This will give himcourage to go on; he will become more vehement in hisassertions and in the end betray himself."6While belief that the target is trusting seems certain todecrease a liar's detection apprehension, it is difficult to sayhow such knowledge will affect other feelings about lying.Some liars may feel more deception guilt in misleading atrusting target than a suspicious one.Others might feel lessguilty, rationalizing that as long as the target does notknow and is not tortured by suspicions, no harm is done.Such liars may believe their lies are motivated primarily bykindness, to spare their victim's sensibilities.Duping de-light also could go either way, strengthened or diminished Dangers and Precautions183if the liar knows the target is trusting.Duping a totallytrusting victim may be especially delicious, indulging en-joyable feelings of contempt; yet, deceiving a suspicioustarget may be exciting because of the challenge.There is no way, then, to predict whether a liar is moreor less likely to make mistakes if his target makes his suspi-cions known.There is, of course, a chance that the suspi-cions are ungrounded; the suspect may be honest.Wouldit be easier to tell that a suspect is truthful if the suspect didnot know he was under suspicion? If he does not know heis suspected of lying, he should not fear being disbelieved;nor would there be anger or distress about being suspectedof lying, and the suspect, even if guilt-ridden, would haveno special opportunity to act as if wrong had been done.This is all to the good, since the signs of any of theseemotions can then be interpreted simply as clues to deceitwithout any need to worry that they might instead be atruthful person's feelings about being suspected.This gainis purchased, however, at the already-mentioned cost thatsome of the feelings about lying that produce clues to de-ceit, particularly detection apprehension, will be weaker ifthis person who does not know anyone suspects him oflying is indeed a liar.When the suspect doesn't know thereis suspicion, the lie catcher is less likely to make disbeliev-ing-the-truth errors because the signs of emotion, if theyoccur, are more likely to be clues to deceit; but there maybe more believing-a-lie mistakes, because feelings aboutlying are less likely to be strong enough to betray the liar.The reverse probably happens if suspicion is knownmore disbelieving-the-truth but less believing-a-lie.Two other problems complicate the matter of whetherthe lie catcher would be better off if the suspect didn'tknow he was under suspicion.First, the lie catcher mayhave no choice.Not every situation will permit the targetto conceal his suspicions.Even if possible, not everyone 184 Telling Lieswho thinks he may be the target of a lie would want toconceal his suspicions, lying to catch a liar.And not everylie catcher has the talent as a liar to succeed undiscoveredin his deceit.The second problem is worse.By trying to conceal hissuspicions, the lie catcher risks failing in this concealmentwithout realizing it.He certainly can't count on the liar tobe truthful about the matter! Some liars may boldly con-front their target once they note that the target is suspi-cious, especially if they can expose their target's attemptsat concealment.The liar may pose self-righteousness, in-dignant and hurt that the target was not forthright abouthis suspicions, unfairly depriving the liar of a chance tovindicate himself.Even if this ploy does not convince, itmay at least intimidate the target for a time.Not every liarwill be so brazen.Some might conceal their discovery thatthe target has become suspicious so that they can gain timeto cover their tracks, prepare an escape, etc.Unfortunately,it is not just the liar who may conceal such a discovery.Truthful people may also conceal that they have discoveredthey are under suspicion.Their reasons can be quite varied.They may conceal knowing that they are under suspicionin order to avoid a scene, or to buy time in which they hopeto gather evidence in their support, or to take actions thatthose who suspect them will judge in their favor if it isthought that they acted unaware of being suspect.One advantage gained by revealing suspicions is thatthis morass of uncertainties can be avoided.At least thetarget knows that the suspect knows there is suspicion [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]