Pokrewne
- Strona Główna
- Złote Wskazówki Jak zarabiać złoto w World of Warcraft Wrath of the Lich King
- Stephen King Mroczna Wieza t3 Ziemie jalowe (rtf)
- King Stephen Mroczna Wieza II Powolanie trojki
- King Stephen Miasteczko Salem (SCAN dal 1051
- Haydon Elizabeth Król Skrytobójca (The Assassin King)
- Stephen King Pokochala Toma Gordona (2)
- King Stephen Christine (SCAN dal 1119)
- King Stephen Mroczna wieza I Roland
- Michael Crichton Linia Cz
- Ks. Adam Skwarczyński – PORADY DUSZPASTERZA (Niezbędnik w trudnych sytuacjach)
- zanotowane.pl
- doc.pisz.pl
- pdf.pisz.pl
- oh-seriously.htw.pl
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.(Author sreduced vehicle availability.collection)The Tiger II s long main armament, the epitome of the family of 88mmantiaircraft/antitank guns that had terrorized enemy armor since the Spanish CivilWar (1936 39), fired high-velocity rounds along a relatively flat trajectory.Incombination with an excellent gunsight, the weapon system was accurate at longrange, which enabled rapid targeting and a high first look/first hit/first kill probability.However, the lengthy barrel s overhang stressed the turret ring, and made traversedifficult when not on level ground.Optimally initiating combat at distances beyondwhich an enemy s main armament could effectively respond, the Tiger II s lethality wasfurther enhanced by its considerable armor protection, especially across the frontalarc that provided for a high degree of combat survivability.Although the vehicle sglacis does not appear to have ever been penetrated during battle, its flanks and rearwere vulnerable to enemy antitank weapons at normal ranges.In the hands of an experienced crew, and under environmental and terrainconditions that promoted long-range combat, the weapon system achieved a high killratio against its Allied and Red Army counterparts.503rd Heavy SS Panzer Battalion,for example, was estimated to have scored an estimated 500 kills during the unit soperational life from January to April 1945.While such a figure was certainly inflatedas accurate record keeping was hindered by the unit s dispersed application and chaoticlate-war fighting where the Soviets eventually occupied a battlefield, it illustrated thesuccess of the weapon system if properly employed and supported.Of 503rd HeavySS Panzer Battalion s original complement of 39 Tiger IIs only ten were destroyedthrough combat, with the remainder being abandoned or destroyed by their crewsdue to mechanical breakdowns or lack of fuel.As 503rd Heavy SS Panzer Battalionnever received replacement tanks like its brethren in 501st and 502nd HeavySS Panzer Battalions (which were given 2.38 and 1.7 times their respective 45-vehicle72TO&E allotments), its Tiger II combat losses averaged less than 50 percent.© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com An IS-2 with a welded,streamlined glacis anda 12.7mm DShK 1938antiaircraft machine gun.The photograph appears tohave been retouched at theend of the gun barrel, eitherto obscure the backgroundor to emphasize the muzzlebrake.(DML)Because of the chaotic combat environment throughout Pomerania, and the needto quickly allocate resources to several threatened sectors at once, the Tiger IIs werefrequently employed singly, or in small groups, often at the will of a local seniorcommander.In much the same way as with the French in 1940, 503rd Heavy SSPanzer Battalion s armor acted more in an infantry-support capacity than as a unifiedarmored fist.The Tiger IIs would perhaps have been better used organizationally tofill a Panzer regiment s heavy company by strengthening existing, depleted parentformations; but instead they remained in semi-independent heavy Panzer battalionsuntil the end of the war.Forced to rely on small-unit tactics, Tiger II crews played totheir strengths by adopting ambush tactics to minimize vehicular movement andpre-combat detection, especially from enemy ground-attack aircraft.As tankers regularly spent long hours in their mounts the Tiger II s relativelyspacious interior helped reduce fatigue, and made operating and fighting within thevehicle somewhat less taxing.A good heating and ventilation system improvedoperating conditions, which then reduced crew mistakes that were all too commonduring a chaotic firefight.Although the Tiger II had well-positioned ammunitionracks that facilitated loading, projectiles that were stored in the turret bustle weresusceptible to potentially catastrophic damage caused by spalling or projectile impacts.Even after Henschel incorporated spall liners to reduce such debris, concerned crewswould often leave the turret rear empty, which correspondingly made room to use therear hatch as an emergency exit.The cost to produce the Tiger II in manpower and time (double that of a 45-tonnePanther), and its high fuel consumption, brought into question why such a designprogressed beyond the drawing board considering Germany s dwindling resourcesand military fortunes.It was partly a response to the perpetual escalation of therequirement to achieve or maintain battlefield supremacy, and much of the blamerested with Hitler and his desire for large armored vehicles that in his view presumably73reflected Germany s might and reinforced propaganda.By not focusing resources on© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com creating greater numbers of the latest proven designs such as the Panther G, Germanauthorities showed a lack of unified direction and squandered an ability to fight a warof attrition until it was too late to significantly affect the outcome.Limited numbersof qualitatively superior Tiger IIs could simply not stem the flood of enemy armor.THE IS-2When the Red Army transitioned to the strategic offensive in early 1943 their skill inoperational deception increasingly enabled them to mass against specific battlefieldsectors, often without the Germans realizing the degree to which they wereoutnumbered until it was too late [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl agnieszka90.opx.pl
.(Author sreduced vehicle availability.collection)The Tiger II s long main armament, the epitome of the family of 88mmantiaircraft/antitank guns that had terrorized enemy armor since the Spanish CivilWar (1936 39), fired high-velocity rounds along a relatively flat trajectory.Incombination with an excellent gunsight, the weapon system was accurate at longrange, which enabled rapid targeting and a high first look/first hit/first kill probability.However, the lengthy barrel s overhang stressed the turret ring, and made traversedifficult when not on level ground.Optimally initiating combat at distances beyondwhich an enemy s main armament could effectively respond, the Tiger II s lethality wasfurther enhanced by its considerable armor protection, especially across the frontalarc that provided for a high degree of combat survivability.Although the vehicle sglacis does not appear to have ever been penetrated during battle, its flanks and rearwere vulnerable to enemy antitank weapons at normal ranges.In the hands of an experienced crew, and under environmental and terrainconditions that promoted long-range combat, the weapon system achieved a high killratio against its Allied and Red Army counterparts.503rd Heavy SS Panzer Battalion,for example, was estimated to have scored an estimated 500 kills during the unit soperational life from January to April 1945.While such a figure was certainly inflatedas accurate record keeping was hindered by the unit s dispersed application and chaoticlate-war fighting where the Soviets eventually occupied a battlefield, it illustrated thesuccess of the weapon system if properly employed and supported.Of 503rd HeavySS Panzer Battalion s original complement of 39 Tiger IIs only ten were destroyedthrough combat, with the remainder being abandoned or destroyed by their crewsdue to mechanical breakdowns or lack of fuel.As 503rd Heavy SS Panzer Battalionnever received replacement tanks like its brethren in 501st and 502nd HeavySS Panzer Battalions (which were given 2.38 and 1.7 times their respective 45-vehicle72TO&E allotments), its Tiger II combat losses averaged less than 50 percent.© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com An IS-2 with a welded,streamlined glacis anda 12.7mm DShK 1938antiaircraft machine gun.The photograph appears tohave been retouched at theend of the gun barrel, eitherto obscure the backgroundor to emphasize the muzzlebrake.(DML)Because of the chaotic combat environment throughout Pomerania, and the needto quickly allocate resources to several threatened sectors at once, the Tiger IIs werefrequently employed singly, or in small groups, often at the will of a local seniorcommander.In much the same way as with the French in 1940, 503rd Heavy SSPanzer Battalion s armor acted more in an infantry-support capacity than as a unifiedarmored fist.The Tiger IIs would perhaps have been better used organizationally tofill a Panzer regiment s heavy company by strengthening existing, depleted parentformations; but instead they remained in semi-independent heavy Panzer battalionsuntil the end of the war.Forced to rely on small-unit tactics, Tiger II crews played totheir strengths by adopting ambush tactics to minimize vehicular movement andpre-combat detection, especially from enemy ground-attack aircraft.As tankers regularly spent long hours in their mounts the Tiger II s relativelyspacious interior helped reduce fatigue, and made operating and fighting within thevehicle somewhat less taxing.A good heating and ventilation system improvedoperating conditions, which then reduced crew mistakes that were all too commonduring a chaotic firefight.Although the Tiger II had well-positioned ammunitionracks that facilitated loading, projectiles that were stored in the turret bustle weresusceptible to potentially catastrophic damage caused by spalling or projectile impacts.Even after Henschel incorporated spall liners to reduce such debris, concerned crewswould often leave the turret rear empty, which correspondingly made room to use therear hatch as an emergency exit.The cost to produce the Tiger II in manpower and time (double that of a 45-tonnePanther), and its high fuel consumption, brought into question why such a designprogressed beyond the drawing board considering Germany s dwindling resourcesand military fortunes.It was partly a response to the perpetual escalation of therequirement to achieve or maintain battlefield supremacy, and much of the blamerested with Hitler and his desire for large armored vehicles that in his view presumably73reflected Germany s might and reinforced propaganda.By not focusing resources on© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com creating greater numbers of the latest proven designs such as the Panther G, Germanauthorities showed a lack of unified direction and squandered an ability to fight a warof attrition until it was too late to significantly affect the outcome.Limited numbersof qualitatively superior Tiger IIs could simply not stem the flood of enemy armor.THE IS-2When the Red Army transitioned to the strategic offensive in early 1943 their skill inoperational deception increasingly enabled them to mass against specific battlefieldsectors, often without the Germans realizing the degree to which they wereoutnumbered until it was too late [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]