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. [179]In setting out its recommendations, the Task Force concluded,  [I]t is only prudent todesign mechanisms to protect investors, the market s infrastructures, the financial system andthe economy from the destructive consequence of violent market breaks. [180] The TaskForce recommended that one agency should coordinate the limited, but critical, regulatoryissues which have an impact across market segments, to work towards the unity ofclearing systems across marketplaces, harmonization of margin requirements acrossmarkets, creation and implementation of circuit breaker mechanisms, and the creation ofinformation systems to monitor transactions in related markets.[181] Although admitting thatneither its resources nor mandate allowed it to consider this one agency, the Task Forcesurmised that the Federal Reserve should be the appropriate agency.Modernizing the Financial System:Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991)Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,Congress directed Treasury to produce recommendations in consultation with thedepository institution regulatory agencies, the OMB, and the private sector to reform andstrengthen the federal deposit insurance system.[182] In February 1991, Treasury issuedModernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (the Green B ook ).[183] Guiding this report were two principles: Deposit insurance reformsmust enhance both the banking system s safety and soundness and the industry scompetitiveness.[184] In developing reforms, Treasury addressed then-current issuesaffecting the banking industry: reduced competitiveness and financial strength caused byoutdated restrictions on banking activities; overextension of deposit insurance; afragmented regulatory system with duplicative regulation; and an undercapitalizeddeposit insurance fund.[185] The  four fundamental reforms of the Green Book werelifting restrictions on banking activities and allowing nationwide banking and commercialownership of banks; reining in the overextended deposit insurance and improvingsupervision with strengthened capital requirements; streamlining the regulatory structure withone federal regulator for a given banking entity; and recapitalizing the Bank InsuranceFund.Two sets of recommendations focused on modernizing and streamlining financialservices regulation.[186] First, given the erosion in the traditional banking franchise, thereport recommended removing the restrictions  protecting banks from competition, such aspermitting well-capitalized banks to have financial affiliates through the creation of financialservices holding companies.[187] These financial affiliates could engage in any financialactivity, including securities, insurance, and mutual fund activities, although the financialservices holding companies could not engage in these activities.[188] At the same time,securities, insurance, and mutual fund companies could affiliate with well- capitalized 162 Martin T.Bannister (Editor)banks,[189] and commercial firms could own financial services holding companies withappropriate firewalls.[190]This proposal had three benefits: This  blending of banking, finance and commerceshould foster a stronger financial services system with consumer and taxpayer benefits.A more attractive, expanded franchise possibility should allow firms withundercapitalized banks to attract capital.To prevent putting the taxpayer at risk with thepotential for expanded deposit insurance and a federal safety net to cover these affiliatedinstitutions, the recommendation included certain safeguards: only well-capitalized bankswould be eligible to engage in these newly permissible activities through financialservices holding companies; unlike banks, financial affiliates and financial servicesholding companies would not have access to the deposit insurance system; capital-basedsupervision would focus on banks; financial affiliates would be separately capitalized;financial activities would be regulated by function, rather than by institution allowing for amore efficient and effective regulatory framework; funding and disclosure firewalls wouldbe created between the bank and its affiliates or holding company; and the bank regulatorwould perform  umbrella oversight of the financial services holding company to understandaffiliate risk and protect the insured bank.[191]In order to produce  greater accountability, efficiency, and consistency of regulation andsupervision, through a reduction in the number of regulators; improved consumer benefits fromthe reduced duplication and overlap; and the separation of the regulator from the insurer,Treasury recommended a restructuring of banking regulation.[192] Treasury based itsproposals upon those in the 1984 Blueprint for Reform and, consequently, like this priorreport, called for the streamlining of the four federal banking regulators into two: theFederal Reserve being responsible for all state-chartered banks and their bank holding companies(removing the FDIC s authority); a new Federal Banking Agency under Treasury assumingthe responsibilities of the OCC, the OTS, and the Federal Reserve s supervisory powers overbank holding companies).[193] The second structural reform called for consolidating alldeposit insurance functions for banks and thrifts into the FDIC.[194]American Finance for the 21st Century (1997)Under the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to review the strengths and weaknesses ofthe financial services system, and, in particular, the adequacy of regulation to meet marketdevelopments.[195] In November 1997, Treasury published American Finance for the 21stCentury.[196]The purpose of the report was to identify the most important market developments, policyissues those developments raise, and provide a regulatory framework for adapting tothose developments.[197] The report laid out the four trends reshaping the financialservices industry:  advances in information and communication technology;globalization; financial innovation; and stronger competition unleashed by the removal ofcounterproductive restrictions. [198] The report then described how these changes wouldimpact  finance s three major functions: payments, intermediation, and the spreading ofrisk. [199] Payments would become increasingly electronic-driven, not paper-driven. Appendix 163Disintermediation would lower prices for consumers at the same time as offering morechoice.[200] With growing securitization, there is greater risk dispersion.The policy issues dominating the report were: removing impediments to competition;[201]protecting taxpayers (and the deposit insurance system);[202] the use of electronicmoney;[203] preserving competition to prevent concentration and rupture.[204] The reportdevotes one of its five chapters to a discussion of risk,[205] including focusing on theclearance and settlement systems (in particular, Fedwire and CHIPS) and an historicalanalysis of regulatory attempts at risk containment and recommendations on suchcontainment [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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