Pokrewne
- Strona Główna
- Frank Herbert Dune 6 Chapterhouse Dune
- Frank Herbert Dune 5 Heretics of Dune
- Herbert Frank Swiat Pandory 01 Epizod z Jezusem
- Herbert Frank Zielony Mozg (SCAN dal 970)
- Herbert Frank Bog Imperator Diuny (SCAN dal 7
- Herbert Frank Diuna Kapitularz (SCAN dal 1068
- Herbert Frank Bog Imperator Diuny
- Morressay John Wyprawa Kedrigerna
- Holynski Marek E mailem z Doliny Krzemowej
- Ahmed Saladin Tron Półksiężyca
- zanotowane.pl
- doc.pisz.pl
- pdf.pisz.pl
- negatyw24.htw.pl
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
. 10 For the moment, the government s view was thatonly former republics of the Soviet Union and China could threaten the UK.Moreover:Of the Third World countries currently possessing or seeking a ballisticmissile capability, none is considered likely to develop the means or intentto pose a direct threat to the UK during the foreseeable future but we canbe less certain about our interests elsewhere (eg NATO s SouthernRegion, Cyprus and Gibraltar and UK forces deployed overseas).11This equivocal, and consistent, position regarding ballistic threats to deployed forces wasand remains somewhat surprising in view of the Gulf War experience and that the IraqiScud targets could just as easily been British as American.The resource implications of amore robust statement of the threat at a time of a reducing defence budget may explainthis reticence.Nonetheless, the Foreign Office did acknowledge that chemical weaponsdelivered by ballistic means could constitute a poor man s nuclear weapon.12 TheMoD s first post-Cold War statement of military doctrine set out the problem in 1996: After the cold war 167International efforts to ban chemical and biological weapons and tocounter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology havehad a measure of success, but many nations around the world are armedwith highly destructive military equipment.This includes& long rangeweapons, such as tactical ballistic missiles, and weapons of massdestruction (some of which may be relatively low technology).Much ofthis weaponry is in unstable regions of the world, where there are manyunresolved issues and potential causes of conflict& 13EARLY POLICYThe renewed interest in ballistic missiles and defence against them did not start with aclean slate.Technical collaboration with the United States was continuing under theterms of the 1985 MoU (see Chapter 8).By mid-1992 government-to-governmentcontracts awarded so far totalled $107.3 million, most then sub-contracted to UKcompanies,14 in addition to work contracted directly between SDIO and Britishcompanies and research institutions.The venerable Bloodhound SAM system was finally withdrawn from service in 1991,but the Ministry of Defence issued Staff Target ST1235 for a replacement MSAMsystem, which could be revised to incorporate a limited ATBM capability.15 Also underdevelopment was a new-generation radar, the Multi-function Electronically ScannedAdaptive Array (MESAR), a version of which would later be selected for the RoyalNavy s new air defence ships and which had obvious BMD potential.16 The Chemicaland Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down was working on an $11.2 millionresearch contract for the Americans on the defeat of attacks by ballistic missiles withchemical or biological warheads.17The MoD itself began to consider, in the light of the Gulf War experience, whatapproach to take to defence against TBMs.18 It was clear, however, that no dramaticchange in policy was to occur immediately:HMG s overall policy is, whilst maintaining adequate defences for theUnited Kingdom, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction; to promote responsibility in the transfer of conventionalweapons, and to seek to prevent destabilising buildups of weapons inregions of tension.19In 1993 Malcolm Rifkind decided that the question of active BMD should be studied.20He spelled out the questions to be addressed in February the following year:We are considering whether there might be a need for a Ballistic MissileDefence system in future.There is a danger in adopting a narrow view ofhard-kill defensive systems as the only response to the proliferation ofballistic missiles.We do not accept this to be self-evidently true [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl agnieszka90.opx.pl
. 10 For the moment, the government s view was thatonly former republics of the Soviet Union and China could threaten the UK.Moreover:Of the Third World countries currently possessing or seeking a ballisticmissile capability, none is considered likely to develop the means or intentto pose a direct threat to the UK during the foreseeable future but we canbe less certain about our interests elsewhere (eg NATO s SouthernRegion, Cyprus and Gibraltar and UK forces deployed overseas).11This equivocal, and consistent, position regarding ballistic threats to deployed forces wasand remains somewhat surprising in view of the Gulf War experience and that the IraqiScud targets could just as easily been British as American.The resource implications of amore robust statement of the threat at a time of a reducing defence budget may explainthis reticence.Nonetheless, the Foreign Office did acknowledge that chemical weaponsdelivered by ballistic means could constitute a poor man s nuclear weapon.12 TheMoD s first post-Cold War statement of military doctrine set out the problem in 1996: After the cold war 167International efforts to ban chemical and biological weapons and tocounter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology havehad a measure of success, but many nations around the world are armedwith highly destructive military equipment.This includes& long rangeweapons, such as tactical ballistic missiles, and weapons of massdestruction (some of which may be relatively low technology).Much ofthis weaponry is in unstable regions of the world, where there are manyunresolved issues and potential causes of conflict& 13EARLY POLICYThe renewed interest in ballistic missiles and defence against them did not start with aclean slate.Technical collaboration with the United States was continuing under theterms of the 1985 MoU (see Chapter 8).By mid-1992 government-to-governmentcontracts awarded so far totalled $107.3 million, most then sub-contracted to UKcompanies,14 in addition to work contracted directly between SDIO and Britishcompanies and research institutions.The venerable Bloodhound SAM system was finally withdrawn from service in 1991,but the Ministry of Defence issued Staff Target ST1235 for a replacement MSAMsystem, which could be revised to incorporate a limited ATBM capability.15 Also underdevelopment was a new-generation radar, the Multi-function Electronically ScannedAdaptive Array (MESAR), a version of which would later be selected for the RoyalNavy s new air defence ships and which had obvious BMD potential.16 The Chemicaland Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down was working on an $11.2 millionresearch contract for the Americans on the defeat of attacks by ballistic missiles withchemical or biological warheads.17The MoD itself began to consider, in the light of the Gulf War experience, whatapproach to take to defence against TBMs.18 It was clear, however, that no dramaticchange in policy was to occur immediately:HMG s overall policy is, whilst maintaining adequate defences for theUnited Kingdom, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction; to promote responsibility in the transfer of conventionalweapons, and to seek to prevent destabilising buildups of weapons inregions of tension.19In 1993 Malcolm Rifkind decided that the question of active BMD should be studied.20He spelled out the questions to be addressed in February the following year:We are considering whether there might be a need for a Ballistic MissileDefence system in future.There is a danger in adopting a narrow view ofhard-kill defensive systems as the only response to the proliferation ofballistic missiles.We do not accept this to be self-evidently true [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]