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.Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE9534.As a matter of subjective judgment, I estimate for thisfigure an accuracy of 10% in deficiency and 20% in excess, i.e.that the result will lie between £6,400 million and £8,800million.35.Germany is also liable under the treaty, as an addition toher liabilities for reparation, to pay all the costs of thearmies of occupation after peace is signed for the fifteensubsequent years of occupation.So far as the text of the treatygoes, there is nothing to limit the size of these armies, andFrance could, therefore, by quartering the whole of her normalstanding army in the occupied area, shift the charge from her owntaxpayers to those of Germany -- though in reality any suchpolicy would be at the expense not of Germany, who by hypothesisis already paying for reparation up to the full limit of hercapacity, but of France's allies, who would receive so much lessin respect of reparation.A White Paper (Cmd.240) has, however,been issued, in which is published a declaration by thegovernments of the United States, Great Britain, and Franceengaging themselves to limit the sum payable annually by Germanyto cover the cost of occupation to £12 million, 'as soon as theAllied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that theconditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorilyfulfilled'.The three Powers reserve to themselves the libertyto modify this arrangement at any time if they agree that it isnecessary.36.Article 235.The force of this article is somewhatstrengthened by article 251, by virtue of which dispensations mayalso be granted for 'other payments' as well as for food and rawmaterial.37.This is the effect of paragraph 12 (c) of annex II of thereparation chapter, leaving minor complications on one side.Thetreaty fixes the payments in terms of gold marks, which areconverted in the above at the rate of 20 to £1.38.If, per impossibile, Germany discharged £500 million in cashor kind by 1921, her annual payments would be at the rate of£62,500,000 from 1921 to 1925 and of £150 million thereafter39.Paragraph 16 of annex II of the reparation chapter.There isalso an obscure provision by which interest may be charged 'onsums arising out of material damage as from 11 November 1918 upto 1 May 1921'.This seems to differentiate damage to propertyfrom damage to the person in favour of the former.It does notaffect pensions and allowances, the cost of which is capitalisedas at the date of the coming into force of the treaty.40.On the assumption which no one supports and even the mostoptimistic fear to be unplausible, that Germany can pay the fullcharge for interest and siding fund from the outset, the annualpayment would amount to £480 million.41.Under paragraph 13 of annex II unanimity is required (i) forany postponement beyond 1930 of instalments due between 1921 and1926, and (ii) for any postponement for more than three years ofGet any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE96instalments due after 1926.Further, under article 234, thecommission may not cancel any part of the indebtedness withoutthe specific authority of all the governments represented on thecommission.42.On 23 July 1914 the amount was £67,800,000.43.Owing to the very high premium which exists on German silvercoin, as the combined result of the depreciation of the mark andthe appreciation of silver, it is highly improbable that it willbe possible to extract such coin out of the pockets of thepeople.But it may gradually leak over the frontier by the agencyof private speculators, and thus indirectly benefit the Germanexchange position as a whole.44.The Allies made the supply of foodstuffs to Germany duringthe armistice, mentioned above, conditional on the provisionaltransfer to them of the greater part of the mercantile marine, tobe operated by them for the purpose of shipping foodstuffs toEurope generally, and to Germany in particular.The reluctance ofthe Germans to agree to this was productive of long and dangerousdelays in the supply of food, but the abortive conferences ofTrèves and Spa (16 January, 14-16 February,and 4-5 March 1919)were at last followed by the agreement of Brussels (14 March1919).The unwillingness of the Germans to conclude was mainlydue to the lack of any absolute guarantee on the part of theAllies that, if they surrendered the ships, they would get thefood.But assuming reasonable good faith on the part of thelatter (their behaviour in respect of certain other clauses ofthe armistice, however, had not been impeccable and gave theenemy some just grounds for suspicion), their demand was not animproper one; for without the German ships the business oftransporting the food would have been difficult, if notimpossible, and the German ships surrendered or their equivalentwere in fact almost wholly employed in transporting food toGermany itself.Up to 30 June 1919, 176 German ships of 1,025,388gross tonnage had been surrendered to the Allies in accordancewith the Brussels agreement.45.The amount of tonnage transferred may be rather greater andthe value per ton rather less.The aggregate value involved isnot likely, however, to be less than £100 million or greater than£150 million.46.This census was carried out by virtue of a decree of 23August 1916.On 22 March 1917, the German government acquiredcomplete control over the utilisation of foreign securities inGerman possession; and in May 1917 it began to exercise thesepowers for the mobilisation of certain Swedish, Danish, and Swisssecurities.47.£ (million)1892.Schmoller 5001892.Christians 6501893-4.Koch 6001905.v.Halle 800(ß)Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE971913.Helfferich 1,000(þ)1914.Ballod 1,2501914.Pistorius 1,2501919.Hans David 1,050(Å)ß.Plus £500 million for investments other than securities.þ Net investments, i.e.after allowance for property in Germanyowned abroad.This may also be the case with some of the otherestimates [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE9534.As a matter of subjective judgment, I estimate for thisfigure an accuracy of 10% in deficiency and 20% in excess, i.e.that the result will lie between £6,400 million and £8,800million.35.Germany is also liable under the treaty, as an addition toher liabilities for reparation, to pay all the costs of thearmies of occupation after peace is signed for the fifteensubsequent years of occupation.So far as the text of the treatygoes, there is nothing to limit the size of these armies, andFrance could, therefore, by quartering the whole of her normalstanding army in the occupied area, shift the charge from her owntaxpayers to those of Germany -- though in reality any suchpolicy would be at the expense not of Germany, who by hypothesisis already paying for reparation up to the full limit of hercapacity, but of France's allies, who would receive so much lessin respect of reparation.A White Paper (Cmd.240) has, however,been issued, in which is published a declaration by thegovernments of the United States, Great Britain, and Franceengaging themselves to limit the sum payable annually by Germanyto cover the cost of occupation to £12 million, 'as soon as theAllied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that theconditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorilyfulfilled'.The three Powers reserve to themselves the libertyto modify this arrangement at any time if they agree that it isnecessary.36.Article 235.The force of this article is somewhatstrengthened by article 251, by virtue of which dispensations mayalso be granted for 'other payments' as well as for food and rawmaterial.37.This is the effect of paragraph 12 (c) of annex II of thereparation chapter, leaving minor complications on one side.Thetreaty fixes the payments in terms of gold marks, which areconverted in the above at the rate of 20 to £1.38.If, per impossibile, Germany discharged £500 million in cashor kind by 1921, her annual payments would be at the rate of£62,500,000 from 1921 to 1925 and of £150 million thereafter39.Paragraph 16 of annex II of the reparation chapter.There isalso an obscure provision by which interest may be charged 'onsums arising out of material damage as from 11 November 1918 upto 1 May 1921'.This seems to differentiate damage to propertyfrom damage to the person in favour of the former.It does notaffect pensions and allowances, the cost of which is capitalisedas at the date of the coming into force of the treaty.40.On the assumption which no one supports and even the mostoptimistic fear to be unplausible, that Germany can pay the fullcharge for interest and siding fund from the outset, the annualpayment would amount to £480 million.41.Under paragraph 13 of annex II unanimity is required (i) forany postponement beyond 1930 of instalments due between 1921 and1926, and (ii) for any postponement for more than three years ofGet any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE96instalments due after 1926.Further, under article 234, thecommission may not cancel any part of the indebtedness withoutthe specific authority of all the governments represented on thecommission.42.On 23 July 1914 the amount was £67,800,000.43.Owing to the very high premium which exists on German silvercoin, as the combined result of the depreciation of the mark andthe appreciation of silver, it is highly improbable that it willbe possible to extract such coin out of the pockets of thepeople.But it may gradually leak over the frontier by the agencyof private speculators, and thus indirectly benefit the Germanexchange position as a whole.44.The Allies made the supply of foodstuffs to Germany duringthe armistice, mentioned above, conditional on the provisionaltransfer to them of the greater part of the mercantile marine, tobe operated by them for the purpose of shipping foodstuffs toEurope generally, and to Germany in particular.The reluctance ofthe Germans to agree to this was productive of long and dangerousdelays in the supply of food, but the abortive conferences ofTrèves and Spa (16 January, 14-16 February,and 4-5 March 1919)were at last followed by the agreement of Brussels (14 March1919).The unwillingness of the Germans to conclude was mainlydue to the lack of any absolute guarantee on the part of theAllies that, if they surrendered the ships, they would get thefood.But assuming reasonable good faith on the part of thelatter (their behaviour in respect of certain other clauses ofthe armistice, however, had not been impeccable and gave theenemy some just grounds for suspicion), their demand was not animproper one; for without the German ships the business oftransporting the food would have been difficult, if notimpossible, and the German ships surrendered or their equivalentwere in fact almost wholly employed in transporting food toGermany itself.Up to 30 June 1919, 176 German ships of 1,025,388gross tonnage had been surrendered to the Allies in accordancewith the Brussels agreement.45.The amount of tonnage transferred may be rather greater andthe value per ton rather less.The aggregate value involved isnot likely, however, to be less than £100 million or greater than£150 million.46.This census was carried out by virtue of a decree of 23August 1916.On 22 March 1917, the German government acquiredcomplete control over the utilisation of foreign securities inGerman possession; and in May 1917 it began to exercise thesepowers for the mobilisation of certain Swedish, Danish, and Swisssecurities.47.£ (million)1892.Schmoller 5001892.Christians 6501893-4.Koch 6001905.v.Halle 800(ß)Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE971913.Helfferich 1,000(þ)1914.Ballod 1,2501914.Pistorius 1,2501919.Hans David 1,050(Å)ß.Plus £500 million for investments other than securities.þ Net investments, i.e.after allowance for property in Germanyowned abroad.This may also be the case with some of the otherestimates [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]