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- zanotowane.pl
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.This gives solidarity to village, prefecture and province, and orders thecountry. 8 Native-place ties thus did not contradict other loyalties and couldevolve into modern nationalism under the pressures of imperialism.Ashistorian Bryna Goodman points out, native-place identity incorporatedfeelings for territory, ancestors, cultural, and linguistic ties, all of which havetended to play important roles in the formation of modern nationalisms. 9Yet the existence of the building blocks of nationalism in the Qing was notthe same thing as full-scale nationalism itself.The philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619 92), living through the collapse ofthe Ming and the conquest of the Qing, articulated the clearest assertionof nationalism before the nineteenth century.Other gentry of his generationoften proclaimed their personal loyalty to the Ming royal house, but Wangstated a principled objection to the Qing: the Manchus could never becomelegitimate rulers because they were a different people as defined in terms ofland, language, customs, and blood, and different peoples could not mixtogether.However, Wang s ethnic nationalism was forgotten, his dangerouswritings unpublished.During the pax Qing, the state had little troublesuppressing the relatively few eruptions of anti-barbarian sentiment, andthere was no speculation about Chinese identity as such.The rediscoveryof Wang and the secret publication of his dangerous works fed the revolu-tionary fervor of the late Qing. 60 The road to revolution, 1895 1919Nationalism and state-building: Liang QichaoThe central question of the first decade of the twentieth century was revolu-tion.The so-called constitutionalists wanted the Qing to pursue reformsmore wholeheartedly and to turn China into a constitutional monarchy.Their main concern was not the fate of the Qing royal house but the fate ofChina.They feared the disruptions that revolution would inevitably bring.Their models were Britain, Germany, and especially Meiji Japan.The revo-lutionaries, by contrast, wanted to overthrow the Qing entirely and create arepublic.Their models were the United States and France.Both sides hadconvincing arguments: the constitutionalists warned that the chaos of revo-lution would encourage imperialists to make further incursions into China,and that the Chinese people were not ready for republicanism.The revolu-tionaries argued that the Qing was simply not committed to reform and thatthe Manchus were irredeemably evil.The constitutionalists envisioned amulti-ethnic state that would eventually be managed by an elected parlia-ment; the monarch would serve as a symbol of national unity.Therevolutionaries envisioned a Han Chinese state without hereditary privilegesand a functioning democracy; some revolutionaries were socialists.Yet it is important to note what both groups shared: a faith in the gradualdevelopment of democratic-constitutional procedures, a sense of theChinese nation as distinct from the dynasty, a commitment to making thisChina wealthy and powerful, and a belief in progress.Neither group reallythought the common people were ready for democracy; strong leadershipand a strong state were required.Constitutionalists and revolutionariesshared another basic premise: that social Darwinism accurately described aworld where the strong eat the weak. Read optimistically, social Darwinismin China constituted an early-twentieth-century version of a moderniza-tion program.In the hands of Yan Fu (1854 1921), evolution became aprogram of institutional change.Yan s translations really, annotatedabridgements the most important of which were of the biologist T.H.Huxley in 1898 and the sociologist Herbert Spencer in 1903 shook a still-Confucian world of cosmic harmony to its roots.In its place, Yan Fuintroduced a world of the struggle for survival and selection of the fittest afearsome place where the unfit perished.Such a picture corresponded to theinternational world China had been discovering since the 1840s, and by theend of the nineteenth century, as the Chinese learned of the contrastingfates of Poland and Japan, the Darwinian version of reality seemedconfirmed.Turning Spencer on his head, they replaced determinism with anew rationalization for planned change.Whether change was to be revolu-tionary or reformist, progress was valued in itself.10The obverse side of social Darwinism was simply that China might be leftbehind to perish like Poland or India.Darwinism found quick appreciationin China because, in spite of the numerous ways it differed fromConfucianism, it made intuitive sense.As Richard Hofstadter has observedin the American context, scientific studies may command so much interest Ideas and ideals in the fall of the Qing 61and acquire so much prestige within the literate community that almosteveryone feels obliged at the very least to bring his world-outlook intoharmony with their findings & 11 In the United States, conservativeswelcomed the new gospel from Britain as confirmation of laissez-faireeconomic competition.Social Darwinism defended the status quo and gavestrength to attacks on reformers and on almost all efforts at the consciousand directed change of society. 12 Its effects in China were almost theprecise opposite, while still giving the same scientific imprimatur to the newnationalism [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.This gives solidarity to village, prefecture and province, and orders thecountry. 8 Native-place ties thus did not contradict other loyalties and couldevolve into modern nationalism under the pressures of imperialism.Ashistorian Bryna Goodman points out, native-place identity incorporatedfeelings for territory, ancestors, cultural, and linguistic ties, all of which havetended to play important roles in the formation of modern nationalisms. 9Yet the existence of the building blocks of nationalism in the Qing was notthe same thing as full-scale nationalism itself.The philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619 92), living through the collapse ofthe Ming and the conquest of the Qing, articulated the clearest assertionof nationalism before the nineteenth century.Other gentry of his generationoften proclaimed their personal loyalty to the Ming royal house, but Wangstated a principled objection to the Qing: the Manchus could never becomelegitimate rulers because they were a different people as defined in terms ofland, language, customs, and blood, and different peoples could not mixtogether.However, Wang s ethnic nationalism was forgotten, his dangerouswritings unpublished.During the pax Qing, the state had little troublesuppressing the relatively few eruptions of anti-barbarian sentiment, andthere was no speculation about Chinese identity as such.The rediscoveryof Wang and the secret publication of his dangerous works fed the revolu-tionary fervor of the late Qing. 60 The road to revolution, 1895 1919Nationalism and state-building: Liang QichaoThe central question of the first decade of the twentieth century was revolu-tion.The so-called constitutionalists wanted the Qing to pursue reformsmore wholeheartedly and to turn China into a constitutional monarchy.Their main concern was not the fate of the Qing royal house but the fate ofChina.They feared the disruptions that revolution would inevitably bring.Their models were Britain, Germany, and especially Meiji Japan.The revo-lutionaries, by contrast, wanted to overthrow the Qing entirely and create arepublic.Their models were the United States and France.Both sides hadconvincing arguments: the constitutionalists warned that the chaos of revo-lution would encourage imperialists to make further incursions into China,and that the Chinese people were not ready for republicanism.The revolu-tionaries argued that the Qing was simply not committed to reform and thatthe Manchus were irredeemably evil.The constitutionalists envisioned amulti-ethnic state that would eventually be managed by an elected parlia-ment; the monarch would serve as a symbol of national unity.Therevolutionaries envisioned a Han Chinese state without hereditary privilegesand a functioning democracy; some revolutionaries were socialists.Yet it is important to note what both groups shared: a faith in the gradualdevelopment of democratic-constitutional procedures, a sense of theChinese nation as distinct from the dynasty, a commitment to making thisChina wealthy and powerful, and a belief in progress.Neither group reallythought the common people were ready for democracy; strong leadershipand a strong state were required.Constitutionalists and revolutionariesshared another basic premise: that social Darwinism accurately described aworld where the strong eat the weak. Read optimistically, social Darwinismin China constituted an early-twentieth-century version of a moderniza-tion program.In the hands of Yan Fu (1854 1921), evolution became aprogram of institutional change.Yan s translations really, annotatedabridgements the most important of which were of the biologist T.H.Huxley in 1898 and the sociologist Herbert Spencer in 1903 shook a still-Confucian world of cosmic harmony to its roots.In its place, Yan Fuintroduced a world of the struggle for survival and selection of the fittest afearsome place where the unfit perished.Such a picture corresponded to theinternational world China had been discovering since the 1840s, and by theend of the nineteenth century, as the Chinese learned of the contrastingfates of Poland and Japan, the Darwinian version of reality seemedconfirmed.Turning Spencer on his head, they replaced determinism with anew rationalization for planned change.Whether change was to be revolu-tionary or reformist, progress was valued in itself.10The obverse side of social Darwinism was simply that China might be leftbehind to perish like Poland or India.Darwinism found quick appreciationin China because, in spite of the numerous ways it differed fromConfucianism, it made intuitive sense.As Richard Hofstadter has observedin the American context, scientific studies may command so much interest Ideas and ideals in the fall of the Qing 61and acquire so much prestige within the literate community that almosteveryone feels obliged at the very least to bring his world-outlook intoharmony with their findings & 11 In the United States, conservativeswelcomed the new gospel from Britain as confirmation of laissez-faireeconomic competition.Social Darwinism defended the status quo and gavestrength to attacks on reformers and on almost all efforts at the consciousand directed change of society. 12 Its effects in China were almost theprecise opposite, while still giving the same scientific imprimatur to the newnationalism [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]