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[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fivepermanent members and foment international public support of Iraq atthe U.N.and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaignand an extensive diplomatic effort.”32 Had Russia and France not protected Saddam from having to comply with the United Nations’ resolutions, thenmultilateralism might have worked.But in the current state of international ethics, how could it work? Accord-ing to Paul Volker’s investigation of the UN’s corrupt oil-for-food pro-gram, Russia had the most companies involved followed by France.It canbe no surprise that Russia and France were Saddam’s strongest defenderson the UN Security Council.33 Furthermore, French diplomat Jean-Bernard Merimee, once France’s ambassador to the United Nations, has been accusedby Volker of accepting substantial bribes from Saddam Hussein in the formof rights to barrels of oil under the Oil for Food scandal.In light of this,France’s defense of the Iraqi dictator, its calls for multilateralism and con-sensus, take on a very different appearance.That France had a hiddenagenda is clear; and so did other nations.It is the persistence of hiddenP1: FCW0521857449c16Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:18The Transatlantic Trap381agendas in multinational forums that make unrealistic proposals for greaterreliance on multilateralism to curb global dangers and ills (such as repressiveregimes).Na¨ıve idealism that denies the reality of corruption and self-dealing thatpermeates the United Nations is dangerous because it plays into the hands ofour adversaries.There is however, a less na¨ıve idealism which its supporterslabel aspirational realism which seeks modest improvements in the UnitedNations, while being cautious about potential pitfalls.Its proponent, MichaelGlennon, contends that America’s decision to unilaterally act in Iraq was pre-cipitated by the de facto collapse of the UN, and argues that the UN can onlybe salvaged by radically reconstructing the institution so that its “laws” areconsonant with the operative cultures of the international community.Theselaws may contain an aspirational element, but idealism cannot go beyondthe bounds which invalidate the law through confusion.Glennon also main-tains national will is more legitimate than that of the United Nations becausethe UN, like the EU, is no more than an expression of bureaucratic prefer-ences while the will of nation states is based on popular will as expressed indemocratic processes.34When the UN has acted effectively (Korea in the 1950s, Iraq in the early1990s), it has been by giving the job to the United States.The UN is powerlesson its own.So what supporters of UN-based multilateralism mean by therule of international law is that American power should be harnessed to thepolitical decisions of the UN.This is all it can mean.“To the principle that human dignity is dependent on the physical powerof nations to defend themselves, these organizations [UN etc.] and theirspokesmen inveterately prefer the quixotic quest for pan-acceptance of uni-versal legal principles.In recent year, we have repeatedly seen the perverseeffects of this disposition.Pitting the humanitarians against the very societiesthat have striven the hardest to abide by legal principles.it has alignedthem instead with terrorists.” 35Strategic Independence requires that United States should cease tryingto cogovern with others including the United Nations and the EuropeanUnion.As a substitute, we should co-coordinate.The difference is that weare compelled to seek consensus in the first instance, risking the kind ofobstructionism we encountered with Iraq, but can operate independentlyin the latter case.The advantage of co-coordination is that we can garnerthe benefit of working with others, without getting too entangled.But if we are to assert the independence of our decision-making in inter-national affairs, then we must be all the more careful about what we chooseto do.And here there is great danger that we will go too far.P1: FCW0521857449c16Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:18382Leading Toward PeaceFocusing on security cooperation rather than multilateralism does notmean that our usual posture with respect to other nations is confrontation(as it was over the Iraqi issue).Instead, cooperation is desirable and oftenpossible; but where there is an impasse which threatens our vital interests,we must be prepared to act unilaterally.After cataloging the changing fortunes of American alliances with othercountries, showing that disagreements have continually reoccurred, evenwith such staunch allies as Britain (over the Suez invasion by Britain in the1950s and the Grenada invasion by America in the 1980s, for example),Dov Zakheim comments, “Does all this mean that ‘there are no alliances,only interests?’ Not at all.The distinction is a false one.All states haveinterests, and when their interests converge often enough they will formalliances.Rarely, if ever, will interests converge all of the time, over years anddecades.When some aspect of those interests diverge, the ties that bindalliances might fray, but are unlikely to come apart if underlying common-alities remain intact.” 36The United States should pursue adaptive, nonentangling engagement.America is not the only nation interested in restraining nuclear proliferation,suppressing nonstate terrorists, and coping with Russia and China, so thatwe will find allies for each of these purposes.We need not tie our handsfurther by a flawed form of multilateralism [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl agnieszka90.opx.pl
.At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fivepermanent members and foment international public support of Iraq atthe U.N.and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaignand an extensive diplomatic effort.”32 Had Russia and France not protected Saddam from having to comply with the United Nations’ resolutions, thenmultilateralism might have worked.But in the current state of international ethics, how could it work? Accord-ing to Paul Volker’s investigation of the UN’s corrupt oil-for-food pro-gram, Russia had the most companies involved followed by France.It canbe no surprise that Russia and France were Saddam’s strongest defenderson the UN Security Council.33 Furthermore, French diplomat Jean-Bernard Merimee, once France’s ambassador to the United Nations, has been accusedby Volker of accepting substantial bribes from Saddam Hussein in the formof rights to barrels of oil under the Oil for Food scandal.In light of this,France’s defense of the Iraqi dictator, its calls for multilateralism and con-sensus, take on a very different appearance.That France had a hiddenagenda is clear; and so did other nations.It is the persistence of hiddenP1: FCW0521857449c16Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:18The Transatlantic Trap381agendas in multinational forums that make unrealistic proposals for greaterreliance on multilateralism to curb global dangers and ills (such as repressiveregimes).Na¨ıve idealism that denies the reality of corruption and self-dealing thatpermeates the United Nations is dangerous because it plays into the hands ofour adversaries.There is however, a less na¨ıve idealism which its supporterslabel aspirational realism which seeks modest improvements in the UnitedNations, while being cautious about potential pitfalls.Its proponent, MichaelGlennon, contends that America’s decision to unilaterally act in Iraq was pre-cipitated by the de facto collapse of the UN, and argues that the UN can onlybe salvaged by radically reconstructing the institution so that its “laws” areconsonant with the operative cultures of the international community.Theselaws may contain an aspirational element, but idealism cannot go beyondthe bounds which invalidate the law through confusion.Glennon also main-tains national will is more legitimate than that of the United Nations becausethe UN, like the EU, is no more than an expression of bureaucratic prefer-ences while the will of nation states is based on popular will as expressed indemocratic processes.34When the UN has acted effectively (Korea in the 1950s, Iraq in the early1990s), it has been by giving the job to the United States.The UN is powerlesson its own.So what supporters of UN-based multilateralism mean by therule of international law is that American power should be harnessed to thepolitical decisions of the UN.This is all it can mean.“To the principle that human dignity is dependent on the physical powerof nations to defend themselves, these organizations [UN etc.] and theirspokesmen inveterately prefer the quixotic quest for pan-acceptance of uni-versal legal principles.In recent year, we have repeatedly seen the perverseeffects of this disposition.Pitting the humanitarians against the very societiesthat have striven the hardest to abide by legal principles.it has alignedthem instead with terrorists.” 35Strategic Independence requires that United States should cease tryingto cogovern with others including the United Nations and the EuropeanUnion.As a substitute, we should co-coordinate.The difference is that weare compelled to seek consensus in the first instance, risking the kind ofobstructionism we encountered with Iraq, but can operate independentlyin the latter case.The advantage of co-coordination is that we can garnerthe benefit of working with others, without getting too entangled.But if we are to assert the independence of our decision-making in inter-national affairs, then we must be all the more careful about what we chooseto do.And here there is great danger that we will go too far.P1: FCW0521857449c16Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:18382Leading Toward PeaceFocusing on security cooperation rather than multilateralism does notmean that our usual posture with respect to other nations is confrontation(as it was over the Iraqi issue).Instead, cooperation is desirable and oftenpossible; but where there is an impasse which threatens our vital interests,we must be prepared to act unilaterally.After cataloging the changing fortunes of American alliances with othercountries, showing that disagreements have continually reoccurred, evenwith such staunch allies as Britain (over the Suez invasion by Britain in the1950s and the Grenada invasion by America in the 1980s, for example),Dov Zakheim comments, “Does all this mean that ‘there are no alliances,only interests?’ Not at all.The distinction is a false one.All states haveinterests, and when their interests converge often enough they will formalliances.Rarely, if ever, will interests converge all of the time, over years anddecades.When some aspect of those interests diverge, the ties that bindalliances might fray, but are unlikely to come apart if underlying common-alities remain intact.” 36The United States should pursue adaptive, nonentangling engagement.America is not the only nation interested in restraining nuclear proliferation,suppressing nonstate terrorists, and coping with Russia and China, so thatwe will find allies for each of these purposes.We need not tie our handsfurther by a flawed form of multilateralism [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]