Pokrewne
- Strona Główna
- Cien wolnosci Dav
- Eddings, Dav
- Farland Dav
- Morrell Dav
- Gordon R. Dickson Smok i Jerzy 2 Smoczy rycerz, t. 2
- Roman Bratny Kolumbowie. Rocznik 20
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- D'Amato Brian Królestwo Słońca 01 1
- Powstanie Narodu polskiego....t.2 MOCHNACKI
- John Grisham Raport Pelikana (3)
- zanotowane.pl
- doc.pisz.pl
- pdf.pisz.pl
- negatyw24.htw.pl
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.”150It seems likely that in all three Allied capitals there was a fear by early April that the Yalta accords were breaking down.151 Moscow was as worried as London and Washington, though for very different reasons.The crisis was eventually patched up—in June Truman and a reluctant Churchill recognized the Polish government after a few token noncommunists were added—but the damage caused bythe row to mutual trust was lasting.At the end of July the Big Three met for a final time at Potsdam, on the edge of Berlin, but this was a very different summit from Yalta.Roosevelt was dead and Churchill was voted out of office during the conference, being replaced by the new Labour leader, Clement Attlee, whose contribution was limited.Byrnes, now Truman’s secretary of state, fixed up a deal—despite British objections—by which the Soviets got their way on the western border of Poland (following the Oder and Western Neisse).But, in return, the Western powers refused to set a total figure for what the Soviets would receive in reparations from Germany.Instead each allywould take what it wanted in equipment, food and raw materials from its zone of occupation and the Soviets would also receive some transfers from the western zones.This deal on reparations did more than the decisions at Yalta to divide Soviet-controlled eastern Germany from the west.152But it was Yalta that became a dirty word in the United States, even before the Potsdam conference began.Reports of the offer of three Soviet seats in the UN General Assembly appeared in theAmerican press on March 29, after the president had briefed the American delegation to San Francisco, supposedly in strictest se-157reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 158sum m i t screcy.This news and the apparent cover-up prompted critical comment from usually friendly papers and commentators.“From then on,” wrote Robert Sherwood,“the very word ‘Yalta’ came to be associated in the public’s mind with secret and somehow shameful deals.”153 At the end of August congressmen started asking why Soviet troops had been allowed to occupy the Kurile Islands, and Byrnes felt obliged to mention for the first time the secret Yalta agreement on the Far East.Both FDR and Stettinius had deniedthat any such agreement had been made.In the extreme Republi-can press, the equation of Yalta with appeasement and deception was already clear in 1945.154In Washington lessons were also being learned about summitry.On April 10, 1945, before Roosevelt’s death,Averell Harriman concluded that FDR’s decision to go to Yalta had been a mistake.The president “at great inconvenience and risk to himself ” accepted Stalin’s choice of venue.“It seems clear,” wrote Harriman, “that this magnanimous act on his part has been interpreted as a sign of weakness and Stalin and his associates are acting accordingly.”155 In June 1945 George Kennan wrote a lengthy indictment of the Westernfailure to stand up to the Russians.Those in Moscow who believed they could always get their way by assertive policies, he said, “can point to the unshakable confidence of the Anglo-Saxons in meetings between individuals, and can argue that Russia has nothing to lose by trying out these policies, since if things at any time get hot all they have to do is allow another personal meeting with western leaders, and thus make a fresh start, with all forgotten.”156Where then should be the verdict today on Yalta? Unlike thesummits of September 1938, these were multifaceted negotiations from which each party came away with something.Roosevelt secured his priorities—agreement on the UN and a Soviet pledge to enter the war against Japan.Churchill managed to avoid firm commitments about Poland’s western border, German dismembermentand reparations—the latter to Stalin’s undisguised irritation.The British also secured a larger role for France in postwar Europe than 158reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 159yalta 19 45either of their partners wanted.Stalin, for his part, gained acceptance of his main territorial goals in Asia and agreements that seemed to recognize his predominance in Poland [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.”150It seems likely that in all three Allied capitals there was a fear by early April that the Yalta accords were breaking down.151 Moscow was as worried as London and Washington, though for very different reasons.The crisis was eventually patched up—in June Truman and a reluctant Churchill recognized the Polish government after a few token noncommunists were added—but the damage caused bythe row to mutual trust was lasting.At the end of July the Big Three met for a final time at Potsdam, on the edge of Berlin, but this was a very different summit from Yalta.Roosevelt was dead and Churchill was voted out of office during the conference, being replaced by the new Labour leader, Clement Attlee, whose contribution was limited.Byrnes, now Truman’s secretary of state, fixed up a deal—despite British objections—by which the Soviets got their way on the western border of Poland (following the Oder and Western Neisse).But, in return, the Western powers refused to set a total figure for what the Soviets would receive in reparations from Germany.Instead each allywould take what it wanted in equipment, food and raw materials from its zone of occupation and the Soviets would also receive some transfers from the western zones.This deal on reparations did more than the decisions at Yalta to divide Soviet-controlled eastern Germany from the west.152But it was Yalta that became a dirty word in the United States, even before the Potsdam conference began.Reports of the offer of three Soviet seats in the UN General Assembly appeared in theAmerican press on March 29, after the president had briefed the American delegation to San Francisco, supposedly in strictest se-157reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 158sum m i t screcy.This news and the apparent cover-up prompted critical comment from usually friendly papers and commentators.“From then on,” wrote Robert Sherwood,“the very word ‘Yalta’ came to be associated in the public’s mind with secret and somehow shameful deals.”153 At the end of August congressmen started asking why Soviet troops had been allowed to occupy the Kurile Islands, and Byrnes felt obliged to mention for the first time the secret Yalta agreement on the Far East.Both FDR and Stettinius had deniedthat any such agreement had been made.In the extreme Republi-can press, the equation of Yalta with appeasement and deception was already clear in 1945.154In Washington lessons were also being learned about summitry.On April 10, 1945, before Roosevelt’s death,Averell Harriman concluded that FDR’s decision to go to Yalta had been a mistake.The president “at great inconvenience and risk to himself ” accepted Stalin’s choice of venue.“It seems clear,” wrote Harriman, “that this magnanimous act on his part has been interpreted as a sign of weakness and Stalin and his associates are acting accordingly.”155 In June 1945 George Kennan wrote a lengthy indictment of the Westernfailure to stand up to the Russians.Those in Moscow who believed they could always get their way by assertive policies, he said, “can point to the unshakable confidence of the Anglo-Saxons in meetings between individuals, and can argue that Russia has nothing to lose by trying out these policies, since if things at any time get hot all they have to do is allow another personal meeting with western leaders, and thus make a fresh start, with all forgotten.”156Where then should be the verdict today on Yalta? Unlike thesummits of September 1938, these were multifaceted negotiations from which each party came away with something.Roosevelt secured his priorities—agreement on the UN and a Soviet pledge to enter the war against Japan.Churchill managed to avoid firm commitments about Poland’s western border, German dismembermentand reparations—the latter to Stalin’s undisguised irritation.The British also secured a larger role for France in postwar Europe than 158reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 159yalta 19 45either of their partners wanted.Stalin, for his part, gained acceptance of his main territorial goals in Asia and agreements that seemed to recognize his predominance in Poland [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]